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The Metonym: Rhetoric and Oral Tradition at the Crossroads
Catherine Quick
 Metaphor is the glamor trope, getting all the attention in literary, linguistic, and 
philosophical circles (for instance, Lakoff and Johnson 1980). However, metonymy, the figure of 
association, may  actually be the more important element to explain how human language and 
thought connect. The honoree of this Festschrift has demonstrated the centrality of metonymic 
referentiality to oral traditional aesthetics and noetics. Metonymy is also a concept in rhetorical 
studies, but  generally  has not been viewed as central to the rhetorical enterprise of persuasion. 
By adopting John Miles Foley’s work as a lens through which to view the rhetorical function of 
metonyms, this article demonstrates that perhaps metonymy is of much greater significance to 
rhetoric than previously thought.
The Metonym in Oral Tradition
 Oral-formulaic theory, until the publication of Foley’s Immanent Art in 1991, seemed to 
portray  the oral traditional artist  not as an artist at  all, but as a technician who put together ready-
made structures—epithets, lines, type-scenes, and the like—into relatively standard packages. 
Because the conventions and quality  of oral traditions appear so different from literary works, 
scholars struggled to understand how great works of literature such as the Iliad, Beowulf, or 
countless others birthed from oral traditions could have developed from such a process. Foley, 
instead of asking how such works came about in spite of their origins, turned the question around
—could the conventions of oral traditions be the source of artistic power rather than a limitation 
to be mitigated? The answer is, of course, yes, and his scholarship identifies metonymy as the 
key to oral traditional art.
Foley defines metonymy as “a mode of signification wherein the part stands for the 
whole . . . a situation in which a text or version is enriched by an unspoken context  that dwarfs 
the textual artifact” (1991:7). For example, the epithets in the Iliad or the Odyssey are not simply 
structural elements strung together, providing a one-to-one correspondence between word and 
object. Rather, they serve as a portal to a larger, complex meaning inherent in the tradition. For 
example, “‘grey-eyed Athena’ would serve as an approved traditional channel or pathway for 
summoning the Athena not just of this or that particular moment, but rather of all moments in the 
experience of audience and poet” (1995:5). In a traditional context, the epithet  is not only  a 
convenient metrical unit, but a metonymic shorthand that allows the poet and the audience to 
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access a rich, complex signification inherent in their common experiences. The performance is 
not merely a passive event for the audience, but an opportunity for co-creation of meaning with 
the poet through the vehicle of the metonymic referent. The performance, in other words, is not 
only an aesthetic event, but a rhetorical event, as the performer, in a manner of speaking, 
persuades the listening audience to participate in and agree with his/her way of directing the 
communal experience.
The Metonym, Rhetorically Speaking
We can trace the rhetorical study  of metonymy back to the ancient Greek rhetoricians, 
who considered it one of the major tropes. However, the ancients tended to define metonymy 
rather vaguely, depending on examples to communicate its meaning (Arata 2005:65). Metonymy, 
like most figures and tropes, was thought to be decorative, a feature of style enhancing the 
beauty of a speech but adding little to the content. More recently, rhetoric has recognized the 
cognitive function of metonymy, starting with the work of Kenneth Burke (1945:503), who 
identified metonymy as one of the four master tropes that play a role in discovering truth (along 
with metaphor, synecdoche, and irony). In other words, a metonym is not merely a literary 
embellishment, but represents the associative process that underlies much of how human beings 
access and create knowledge. As a persuasive tool, metonymy allows a rhetor to tap  into shared 
associations with his or her audience. 
The previous sentence is a useful, albeit reductive, definition of the Burkean concept of 
rhetorical identification. For Burke, “you persuade a man only  insofar as you can talk his 
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with 
his” (1969:55). Essentially, Burke believed that human beings are naturally alienated from one 
another. The rhetoric of identification is an attempt to create connection and eliminate the 
division. Metonymic referentiality  can be viewed as a type of identificatory  rhetoric—the oral 
traditional poet not only  creates complex, traditional meaning by the use of recognized epithets, 
but he also creates a commonality  with and among listeners. Using and understanding the 
associative meanings of the epithet demonstrates that an individual belongs to this traditional 
community. An outsider wanting to belong must come to understand not  just the words, but their 
associative meaning. An outsider seeking to move this audience rhetorically can do so by 
effectively tapping into the same metonymic system of reference used by  the oral traditional 
poet, by identifying himself or herself with the values and assumptions that the audience 
traditionally associates with these words.
Tradition as Rhetoric
When I present the concept of metonymic referentiality to students in various courses in 
rhetoric or literacy studies, I ask them to tell me the story  of the three little pigs. Most  students 
can easily string together the appropriate phrases and sequence of events: houses of straw, sticks, 
and bricks; “little pig, little pig, let me (come) in;” and so on. This example clearly illustrates to 
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them how the structural aspects of an oral tradition allow the oral poet, with no recourse to 
writing, to string together long poems. But more is required to understand how these features 
create meaning, which is the essence of metonymic referentiality. Meaning is also the necessary 
element for such features to work as rhetoric.
Recently, when one student said, “and then a wolf comes in,” another student quickly 
corrected, “no, it’s a big bad wolf.” The second student’s correction is crucial. A wolf is just a 
large snarly dog; a big bad wolf is a metonymic reference to a tradition of fairy tales. Because 
children in the United States grow up experiencing multiple stories of big bad wolves, the sum 
total of every single example is evoked by the use of the familiar phrase. The idea is so ingrained 
that for the metonym to work, one does not even need to be telling a fairy tale. The phrase can 
easily be transferred to a different rhetorical context; a politician, for instance, could label an 
opponent a “big bad corporate wolf” who threatens working class jobs. Because of the 
audience’s traditional associations with the phrase “big bad wolf,” the charge resonates not only 
in the situation of the speech, but taps into the emotions of fear and threat to innocence 
represented by the wolf in the fairy tales. “Wolf” by itself can certainly work rhetorically; 
metaphorically, it embodies the image of a dangerous and predatory animal. But the full phrase 
“big bad wolf” works on a much deeper level by creating a cognitive pathway to the fairy  tale 
tradition, perhaps long forgotten on a conscious level, but easily accessible through the familiar 
metonymic trigger.
More importantly, the echo of the fairy tale tradition in the rhetor’s use of metonymy is 
an attempt to establish a connection between the rhetor and the audience. The politician’s speech 
is not, strictly speaking, a traditional performance. However, the invoking of a traditional 
construct is a powerful rhetorical act that seeks to unite speaker and audience, to create a sense 
that they are indeed a community because they have a common referent from which to draw. The 
metonym attempts to create a shadow-tradition to convince the audience that they and the 
speaker have that shared experience. It says, we speak the same language, we understand each 
other, and we are united as a community in this moment. Thus the politician’s “big bad wolf” 
metonym is not only a pathway to associations of the fairy tale wolf, it is a pathway to the much 
more significant subconscious notion of the shared traditional experience itself, Burkean 
identification at its deepest level.
Conclusion
The rhetorical need to create community by metonymically tapping into shared 
experience has never been more apparent  than in the information age. Russ Willerton 
(2005:10-11) demonstrates that visual images (so important in a multimedia world) with a 
metonymic reference to their theme, such as an apple on a desk to represent education, are easier 
for designers to convey and for their audiences to understand. The shared associations allow a 
visual shorthand for the designers that functions similarly to those used by the oral poet or the 
rhetor. The success of any blog or Internet discussion forum relies on a group of individuals who 
are complete strangers in real life to form an online community, with an emerging language that 
expresses the shared assumptions and values of that community. Ask any long-term participant in 
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the Chronicle of Higher Education’s forum discussions about “hu.” On the surface or to an 
outsider, it’s a simple gender-neutral pronoun. Metonymically, in this community, it’s a word to 
use if you are spoiling for a fight—it invokes a long (in Internet terms) history of arguments 
about its use and appropriateness.
Foley’s groundbreaking work on The Pathways Project  (2011-) demonstrates that ancient 
modes of communication and performance have much in common with those of the Internet age. 
Redefining the place of interaction for a performer or an Internet user as an Agora, or 
marketplace, Foley compares oral traditional performance and Internet interaction in ways that 
productively  elucidate both. In terms of the metonym, “oWords” (oral traditional units of 
thought) and “eWords” (electronic units of thought) are shown to function similarly in creating 
idiomatic, community-dependent pathways to meaning. The key similarity, however, is in the 
lack of closure. Unlike a text that  is static and contained, both the o-performance and the e-
performance are open-ended, dynamic, and changeable. This characteristic of Internet 
communication is vital for scholars of rhetoric to note. It affects the choices made by a rhetor, 
who must  adapt persuasive techniques to this changeable medium. More importantly, it enables 
the understanding that those choices are rooted in oral traditions—an essential part  of human 
communication and communal identity formation that predates the formal study of rhetoric by 
millennia.
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